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ELHAUGE ON TYING: 
VINDICATED BY HISTORY 
Barak D. Richman* and Steven W. Usselman** 
Einer Elhauge is almost singlehandedly winning a battle against the Single Mo-
nopoly Theory. The theory, as popularized by early Chicago School theorists,1 argues 
that a “vertically integrated monopolist can earn monopoly profit only in one of the mar-
kets—either the upstream or downstream market, but not both [and that] firms typically 
cannot extend monopoly power over one product to other products without sacrificing 
total profit.”2 The theory has been used to decry most any antitrust prohibition on vertical 
restraints or product bundling. If a monopolist engages in restrictive contracts, vertical 
acquisitions, or assorted tying arrangements, the theory goes, it can only be motivated by 
efficiency concerns. After all, if there is only one monopoly profit, then there are no 
more anticompetitive rents to be obtained, only gains from efficiencies.3 
Though such a permissive attitude might be emblematic of adherents to an extreme 
view of the Chicago School of Antitrust, there has been surprisingly strong support for 
relaxing the rules against tying, both in academia and in the Supreme Court. Following a 
strict version of the Coase Theorem, the logic suggests that any effort invested in obtain-
ing market power in an adjacent market will be (at least) countered by a loss in the rents 
currently enjoyed in the monopolized market. And any effort to extract higher prices in a 
competitively supplied good or service will be disciplined by sophisticated purchasers. 
Professor Elhauge decisively entered this fray with his 2009 Harvard Law Review 
article, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory.4 
Decrying that “[t]ying law has for too long been in the thrall of the single monopoly 
profit theory,”5 Professor Elhauge argued that contrary to Chicago’s conventional wis-
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dom, “single monopoly profits are the exception, not the rule.”6 Offering an “analytical 
autopsy,” Professor Elhauge concluded persuasively, “[i]t is time to declare the death of 
the single monopoly profit theory.”7 
Professor Elhauge’s systematic attack—and in subsequent work, counterattack8—
on the single monopoly theory involves more analytic detail than is necessary to parse 
here. The essence of the debate, particularly as it relates to the law of tying, is whether 
antitrust law should permit actions against purportedly illegal ties.9 Proponents of the 
single monopoly theory argue that tying offers no supra-monopoly profit, and therefore 
no additional deadweight loss, on top of any legal monopoly power. Professor Elhauge 
argues, in contrast, that prohibiting monopolists from bundling different goods would 
indeed lead to greater economic surplus. 
Most of this debate between Professor Elhauge and his critics has occurred on the-
oretical grounds, resting on arguments invoking economic models and theory. This arti-
cle brings some empirics into the discussion. It examines one case study—the many anti-
trust actions of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) against International Business 
Machines (“IBM”)—and evaluates the consequences of the DOJ’s repeated scrutiny of 
IBM’s assorted tying arrangements. It concludes, first, that the DOJ was successful in 
forcing IBM to unbundle several of its significant bundling strategies—i.e., but for the 
DOJ’s scrutiny, IBM would have proceeded bundling several of its products and ser-
vices; and second, when IBM acceded to the DOJ’s demands and ended the targeted 
bundling arrangements, it proceeded to open new markets and unleash significant eco-
nomic surplus. In short, this case study offers at least one instance in which prosecuting 
illegal ties yielded significant social benefits. 
IBM’S HISTORY OF ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 10 
Usselman (2009) sets the scene for IBM’s showdown with DOJ antitrust enforcers: 
 
Few American corporations of the twentieth century achieved 
greater notoriety than International Business Machines (IBM). Under 
the sustained leadership of Thomas J. Watson and his son Tom, IBM 
rose from a modest-sized supplier of punched-card accounting equip-
ment in the 1910s to become the world’s dominant supplier of electron-
                                                	   6.	  	   Id.	  	   7.	  	   Id.	  	   8.	  	   Einer	  Elhauge,	  The	  Failed	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  of	   the	  Single	  Monopoly	  Profit	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  COMPETITION	  POL’Y	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   155	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   Einer	   Elhauge,	   Should	   Ties	   without	   a	   Substantial	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   Per	   Se	   Illegal?	   (un-­‐published	  manuscript)	  (on	  file	  with	  author).	  	   9.	  	   The	  traditional	  definition	  of	  a	  tie	  is	  when	  a	  seller	  refuses	  to	  sell	  one	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  unless	  the	  buyer	  also	  takes	  another	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  See	  EINER	  ELHAUGE	  &	  DAMIEN	  GERARDIN,	  GLOBAL	  ANTITRUST	  LAW	  AND	  ECONOMICS	  562	  (2d	  ed.	  2011).	  	   10.	  	   The	  remainder	  of	  this	  article	  relies	  heavily	  on	  excerpted	  portions	  of	  Steven	  W.	  Usselman,	  Unbun-­‐
dling	   IBM:	   Antitrust	   and	   the	   Incentives	   to	   Innovation	   in	   American	   Computing,	   in	   THE	   CHALLENGE	   OF	  REMAINING	  INNOVATIVE	  249	  (Sally	  H.	  Clarke,	  Naomi	  R.	  Lamoreaux	  &	  Steven	  W.	  Usselman	  eds.,	  2009)	  [here-­‐inafter	  Usselman	  (2009)];	  and	  Steven	  W.	  Usselman,	  Public	  Policies,	  Private	  Platforms:	  Antitrust	  and	  Amer-­‐
ican	  Computing,	   in	   INFORMATION	  TECHNOLOGY	  POLICY:	  AN	   INTERNATIONAL	  HISTORY	  97	   (Richard	  Coopey	  ed.,	  2004)	  [hereinafter	  Usselman	  (2004)].	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ic computers, the glamour product of the American Century. When the 
younger Watson relinquished the helm in 1971, IBM had the highest 
market capitalization of any American company. Foreign governments 
strained to create their own champions capable of matching the Ameri-
can giant, while vanquished competitors such as General Electric and 
RCA left the computer market to Big Blue. As further advances in 
hardware and programming drove computing down in price and size 
and brought it into a much wider realm of applications, IBM retained a 
powerful presence in virtually every segment of the broadening market. 
As IBM navigated a course through the startling technological 
transformations that have characterized modern information technolo-
gy, it persistently faced a challenge . . . the threat of antitrust prosecu-
tion. In 1936, just months after IBM secured a major contract from the 
new Social Security Administration that would help make its punched-
card equipment a ubiquitous feature of private and public bureaucra-
cies, the Department of Justice won an antitrust suit against the compa-
ny. As IBM vaulted to leadership in electronic computing during the 
early 1950s, Justice launched another investigation, which culminated 
in 1956 with a comprehensive consent decree. A decade later, with 
IBM still in the throes of executing the massive System/360 project that 
replaced its entire product line with machines built from solid state 
components manufactured in its own plants, Justice intervened once 
more. The resultant suit, one of the most significant in the annals of an-
titrust, lasted from early 1969 to 1982. By the time a judge dismissed 
the suit as “without merit,” IBM had successfully launched its widely 
heralded PC. Even when the firm’s fortunes later turned sharply down-
ward, antitrust remained a significant element in its strategic thinking. 
In an ironic twist, IBM provided vital testimony on behalf of the Justice 
Department in its case against Microsoft, the company that had dis-
placed Big Blue atop the industry. Meanwhile, IBM renegotiated its 
own agreement with government, which agreed to remove key provi-
sions from the consent decree that had governed IBM’s behavior since 
1956. 
The ongoing engagement between IBM and the Department of 
Justice bore many marks of an epic struggle between rival combatants. 
The elder Watson had once gone to jail for antitrust violations while 
employed at NCR. He brooked no compromise with the Department of 
Justice and castigated his son for negotiating a consent decree. The 
younger Watson implied in his memoirs that the stress of countering 
the suit launched in 1969 and several accompanying private antitrust 
actions contributed to the heart attack that forced his early retirement as 
CEO. IBM spent a small fortune defending itself against these claims, 
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as legions of lawyers and economists on both sides devoted years of the 
professional1ives to the cases.11  
 
But the stakes were unquestionably high, and despite unfortunate collateral dam-
age, the economic history flowing from those suits suggest that the Justice Department’s 
efforts produced fruitful results. Usselman (2009) continues: 
 
At issue, from the first dispute of the 1930s through the Microsoft 
case, was a fundamental set of business practices [the heart of the IBM 
business model] that the elder Watson had instilled upon his arrival at 
IBM in 1914. Those practices were aimed at providing comprehensive 
services obtained from tightly integrated systems. At the heart of these 
systems stood a proprietary technology, known as the accounting ma-
chine in the electromechanical age and later as the central processing 
unit (or CPU) during the computer era. Attached to it were an array of 
peripheral devices, including readers to input stored data and printers to 
present results in various forms. The separate components in an instal-
lation were linked through distinctive means—by punched cards of 
unique format in the electromechanical era, and later by exclusive in-
put-output channels and software programs known as operating sys-
tems—over which IBM also retained close proprietary control. The 
precise mix of devices varied from customer to customer, as IBM rep-
resentatives in the field worked to tailor each system to the needs of the 
particular client. IBM technicians visited these sites regularly, in some 
cases maintaining a virtually constant presence, in order to keep the 
equipment running and to devise further uses for it. This package of 
equipment and services came at a single comprehensive price, unique 
to each installation. For many decades, such prices were expressed 
strictly in terms of a monthly rental charge, as IBM in all cases retained 
ownership of the equipment and leased it to customers. The practice 
remained common even after the 1956 consent decree required IBM to 
sell as well as lease its products. 
Antitrust proceedings against IBM aimed at breaking apart this 
integrated approach to conducting its business. Both government and 
private litigators sought to compel IBM to separate the various compo-
nents of its bundled products and services, to make each available in-
dependently from the others, and to set distinct prices for each of them. 
Though the specific remedies varied from case to case, as technology 
changed and antitrust doctrine evolved, this was the persistent objec-
tive. IBM’s adversaries looked to “unbundle” the components and ser-
vices that made up the integrated systems. They sought to establish 
                                                	   11.	  	   Usselman	  (2009),	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  249-­‐50	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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clearly defined targets of modest scope at which competitors could take 
aim. Their objectives paralleled precisely those pursued more recently 
by government prosecutors, and by IBM itself, when they attempted to 
force software giant Microsoft to draw clear boundaries between its op-
erating systems and applications software.12 
THE CONSENT DECREE OF 1936 –  
UNBUNDLING ACCOUNTING MACHINES AND PUNCH CARDS 
Usselman (2009) describes IBM’s earliest foray with antitrust scrutiny: 
 
IBM began its long engagement with antitrust in the mid-1930s, 
at a time when its fortunes otherwise ran high. Though rental income 
dipped slightly following the Crash of 1929, business demand for 
[IBM’s] punched-card equipment soon stabilized, as firms seeking 
paths to recovery frequently revamped their accounting procedures. 
New government programs mandating standard reporting of data fur-
ther stimulated demand. A federal contract to manage information for 
the new Social Security Administration, secured in 1935, soon account-
ed for a significant portion of IBM’s rising revenues. Watson’s profit-
sharing agreement made him the nation’s highest paid business execu-
tive. Such conspicuousness attracted scrutiny. The Department of Jus-
tice took IBM to court in May 1936. Sixteen days later, a panel of jus-
tices returned a resounding verdict against the company. 
The central issue in this case involved IBM’s practice of requir-
ing customers who leased its [accounting] machines to purchase 
punched cards [which stored the data for accounting processing and 
were used with the machines] from IBM. Government prosecutors 
complained that the provision [held captive customers who leased ma-
chines and were forced to purchase punch cards.]13  
 
DOJ antitrust enforcers claimed that such a practice constituted an illegal tie, both 
enabling IBM to earn inordinately large returns from punch cards and preventing them 
from switching to accounting equipment supplied by IBM’s competitors. Usselman 
(2009) continues:  
 
[P]rosecutors noted that the federal government itself, when contracting 
with IBM for services associated with Social Security and other pro-
grams, had secured a special agreement under which it could manufac-
ture its own cards in the standard IBM format. Lawyers for IBM coun-
tered [with what were already the traditional defenses of tying:] that the 
                                                	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  249-­‐50	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	   13.	  	   Id.	  at	  252	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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company must maintain control over cards in order to ensure quality, 
thereby keeping its leased machines in good working order and pre-
serving its reputation for reliable performance. The government pro-
duction facility, defense attorneys suggested, would utilize manufactur-
ing equipment supplied by IBM and operate under the watchful eye of 
its technicians. Paper for the cards would come from suppliers ap-
proved by IBM. A skeptical court, noting that government had agreed 
to pay substantially higher rental charges in order to gain the privilege 
of producing its own cards, shrugged away the arguments about quality 
control. IBM could achieve the same end, judges asserted, by publish-
ing technical standards for the cards. The court ordered IBM to drop the 
card purchase requirement and compelled the firm to assist alternative 
suppliers of cards in starting production facilities that would compete 
with IBM’s.14 
 
Culminating in a consent decree, IBM agreed to create a separate market for the 
punched cards. The decree marked an early example of antitrust policymakers aiming to 
unbundle components that had historically been closely joined in an integrated system. 
Nonetheless, it did little to slow IBM’s advance in the market for accounting machines—
perhaps proving that IBM’s quality justifications for the tie were unfounded—and per-
haps had little time to open new markets, as a superior generation of equipment was on 
the rise following World War II. 
THE CONSENT DECREE OF 1956 – UNBUNDLING EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES 
Usselman (2004) describes the events leading to and following the 1956 consent 
decree, which meaningfully shaped IBM’s business strategy and had a profound impact 
on the development of the American computing industry:  
 
In breaking apart [the] bonds [that connected IBM’s accounting 
machines and the associated punch cards], government [regulators] 
hoped to create space for competition involving both price and innova-
tion. By the end of the 1940s, however, this decree had largely failed to 
accomplish the desired affect [sic]. As worldwide demand for account-
ing equipment soared during the war and after, IBM revenues reached 
unprecedented levels. The firm actually gained market share. Not sur-
prisingly, Justice began investigating, and the younger Thomas Watson, 
walking a fine line between his incensed father and government, en-
tered into negotiations that would stretch across several years before re-
sulting in a consent decree. These negotiations occurred at the very 
time Tom Watson was devising his strategies for computing, and they 
unquestionably shaped his choices. Watson understood clearly that Jus-
                                                	   14.	  	   Id.	  at	  252-­‐53.	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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tice would not permit him to acquire expertise in electronics and com-
puting by purchasing concerns such as the pioneering firm of Eckert 
and Mauchly, who had approached him about a sale. IBM would have 
to develop its own capabilities in the new technology (Its competitor, 
Sperry-Rand, was allowed to purchase Eckert and Mauchly). 
The subsequent consent decree of January 1956 went even fur-
ther [than its 1936 predecessor]. Its principal provisions called for IBM 
to sell as well as lease its products and to allow consumers to purchase 
parts of their systems from competitors. To facilitate the integration of 
components from rival suppliers, government required that IBM license 
its patents and technology. Government hoped . . . these measures 
[would] break open the closed world of IBM and to facilitate competi-
tion by giving upstarts clearer targets upon which to concentrate their 
efforts. In effect, the Justice Department positioned IBM as a broker or 
common carrier for component and peripherals manufacturers and for 
applications programmers, much as the FCC had done with network 
broadcasters. 
To this end, the 1956 consent decree also insisted IBM set up a 
new entity, the Service Bureau Corporation (SBC). This wholly owned 
subsidiary would offer data processing services. While utilizing IBM 
equipment, the service bureau would operate independently from its 
parent. The consent decree banned SBC from hiring IBM personnel or 
using the IBM logo. More importantly, it called for open distribution of 
all operating manuals and other technical materials flowing between 
IBM and SBC. At a time when virtually no one had imagined the idea 
of prepackaged software products, the creation of an entity such as 
SBC constituted a first step toward unbundling hardware and services 
and creating separate forums of competition for each.15 
[SBC did, indeed, grow to become a very substantial company.] 
By 1958, it had achieved annual revenue of approximately $40 million. 
This amounted to just under 3.0 percent of IBM’s total revenue for that 
year and about 4.5 percent of the revenue IBM generated from its activ-
ities in data processing. [Yet] [m]uch of this business likely represented 
a shift from services previously performed by IBM to the new subsidi-
ary, as the parent reported a drop in the services share of data pro-
cessing revenue from 5.0 percent in 1955 to 2.8 percent in 1958 to a 
low of 2.0 percent in 1961. Meanwhile, SBC’s share of IBM’s data 
processing revenue held steady at about 3.0 percent into the early 
1960s. For 1963, it reported revenue of $65 million, [whereas] IBM 
generated more than $2.8 billion in revenue that year, more than double 
the figure from 1958, with over $2.2 billion coming from data pro-
                                                	   15.	  	   Usselman	  (2004),	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  100-­‐01	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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cessing.  
During the mid-1960s, revenue from both SBC and [IBM] ser-
vices spiked upward, [and] . . . [b]y 1966, revenues at SBC had crept up 
to $150 million, or more than 4.6 percent of the IBM total from data 
processing, while services held steady at roughly 3.5 percent. Together, 
SBC and services accounted for more than 8 percent of IBM’s data 
processing revenues that year.16 
 
But SBC’s more profound economic impact was how it reshaped the industrial or-
ganization of computing. Usselman (2004) continues: 
 
A glance through the annual reports of the parent firm from the 
late 1950s and early 1960s reveals one overriding theme: A concern 
with developing new applications for computers. During these years, 
IBM publicists struggled to find ways to educate stockholders and oth-
ers about concepts such as “programming” and “software.” For several 
years running, those writing the annual report felt compelled to define 
these terms. Only by developing such applications tools, they stressed, 
could IBM open new markets and sustain the remarkable rates of 
growth in its sales of computer hardware. 
This emphasis on programming [directly implicated SBC’s quasi-
independent role in the marketplace] . . . as an operator of several com-
plex computer hardware installations, [SBC] might conceivably have 
become a source or at least a testing ground) for [IBM’s] new applica-
tions programming. Given the requirements in the consent decree that 
IBM and SBC openly publicize their technical communications, such 
developments might then have diffused through the industry and 
spawned considerable competition. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, 
IBM chose not to give SBC a prominent role in its efforts to develop 
new applications. Instead, IBM marshaled much of its programming 
talent toward the new Applied Systems Development Division 
(ASDD), which it created in 1959. Under the leadership of Jerrier Had-
dad, who had made his mark in system design, this group would ex-
plore complex applications. Each of the two established product divi-
sions and the giant marketing division, meanwhile, would likewise 
renew their focus on developing new applications software for their 
customers. [The parent firm also created a new series of Data Centers 
in the early 1960s.] Offering services such as real-time database pro-
cessing, these centers seemingly operated in direct competition with 
SBC, and at least some observers felt they clearly violated the consent 
decree. The rise of these centers might explain why SBC revenues had 
                                                	   16.	  	   Id.	  at	  101	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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by the early 1970s receded sharply to just over $60 million annually, or 
less than 1 percent of the revenue IBM derived each year from data 
processing.17  
 
In the 1960s, IBM’s responses to these emerging markets only reinforced their in-
dependent economic significance. IBM began making heavy investments in training new 
programmers, developing new applications for its hardware, and creating new markets 
for computers and computing services. Usselman (2004) describes that the unbundling 
posed a challenge to IBM, and IBM’s vigorous response further fueled the industry’s dy-
namic growth: 
 
[IBM’s struggles with having SBC separated from IBM’s hard-
ware divisions] point to the difficulties of breaking a firm into separate 
entities along functional lines. Despite its avowed desire to develop 
new programming applications, IBM clearly preferred to keep devel-
opments in software tightly coupled to those in hardware. Given the 
state of computer technology at the time, IBM had some compelling 
technical reasons to keep software and hardware joined in this way. 
With memory and central processing unit capacity severely limited, 
systems design still involved significant fundamental trade-offs be-
tween hardware and software. Machines still aimed at either the com-
mercial or scientific user. Yet even as IBM strove to collapse such dis-
tinctions and to produce general-purpose machines in standard 
format—a pursuit that resulted in the announcement of the System 360 
line of computers in April 1964—it still preferred not to separate hard-
ware so completely from services and programming. For in addition to 
facilitating technical compromises, the ties between these activities 
gave IBM enormous flexibility in its business practices. Most im-
portantly, they introduced substantial latitude into its pricing, because 
sales representatives could as necessary offer customers various 
amounts of services and programming for no additional charge. Such 
practices gave IBM an important strategic advantage. (In 1995, new 
CEO Louis Gerstner would renegotiate the 1956 consent decree with 
the Justice Department in order to regain absolute freedom for IBM to 
bundle products and services in any manner it pleased and offer a sin-
gle comprehensive price.)18 
Yet if IBM proved resistant to decoupling hardware from ser-
vices (and their close cousin, programming) and capable of turning the 
government-created service bureau into a neglected stepchild, the ex-
periment at market segmentation of 1956 was not without effect. SBC 
and other service bureaus, though largely forgotten today, emerged as 
                                                	   17.	  	   Id.	  at	  101-­‐02	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  102-­‐03	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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important intermediaries between hardware suppliers and computer us-
ers. Some of the service bureaus began to focus upon particular sorts of 
customers with common data processing needs. Ross Perot, a premiere 
IBM salesman, left the firm in 1962 to found Electronic Data Services 
(EDS), which grew into a spectacularly successful enterprise by focus-
ing upon the needs of government contractors. In cultivating such nich-
es, pioneering bureaus sometimes developed software tools that could, 
with some customizing, be used by many customers. In this way, they 
helped promote the idea of software as a consumer-oriented packaged 
product, whose development costs could be spread across a large num-
ber of customers.19 
. . . . . 
This critical learning process would, perhaps, have occurred 
without the consent decree of 1956. But in sending a clear signal to en-
trepreneurs that they could enter the service business without discrimi-
nation from the largest supplier (indeed, they could anticipate that sup-
plier making available important technical information), government 
almost certainly encouraged the evolution in thinking about the nature 
of the industry. [Antitrust regulators certainly felt gratification in seeing 
the industry grow and diversity.] The experience of watching IBM re-
spond to the service bureaus, moreover, helped spur the Justice De-
partment to launch the next round of antitrust action and significantly 
influenced its thinking about the industry.20 
THE ANTITRUST ACTION OF 1969 – UNBUNDLING HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
Usselman (2004) describes the subsequent battle between IBM and DOJ antitrust 
enforcers that ultimately gave birth to the American software industry: 
 
The Justice Department again began taking a hard look at the 
computer industry in January 1967, when it declared its intent to inves-
tigate business practices at IBM. Two years later, on the final day of the 
Johnson administration, Attorney General Ramsey Clark filed an anti-
trust suit against the firm. The first item of contention in the suit in-
volved the bundling of hardware with software and services. At the 
urging of chief counsel Burke Marshall, who had joined IBM after a 
stint as assistant attorney general in which he had responsibility for an-
titrust, IBM had already announced during 1968 that it would offer 
separate pricing on services and applications programs. In pressing 
forward with the suit, government signaled its intent both to make cer-
tain IBM followed through on this shift in policy and to seek restitution 
                                                	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  103	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  104	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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for any enduring advantages IBM may have derived from its previous 
practices. Government would carry this inquiry forward with great per-
sistence. The case stretched over more than a dozen years, until a fed-
eral judge with the concurrence of the Reagan Justice Department 
deemed it without merit in January 1982. In the interim, the Justice De-
partment had lent its support to several private antitrust actions as well, 
including the suit by Control Data that resulted in the sale of the SBC 
in 1973. 
On their surface, these events point to a straightforward interpre-
tation: Antitrust action, though not resulting in an ultimate victory for 
government in the courts, prompted IBM to alter its business practices 
in fundamental ways and in the process created a distinct market for 
computer software. Though IBM fought this interpretation in the 
courts, arguing that the decision to unbundle resulted from concerns 
about costs and other economic factors, this view seems rapidly to be 
taking hold, both among academics and participants. In his 1993 auto-
biography, for instance, Tom Watson unequivocally attributed the deci-
sion to unbundle to Marshall’s advice regarding antitrust. Watts 
Humphrey, who headed IBM’s programming efforts at the time and 
played an instrumental role on the task force assigned to carry out the 
new policy, has recently recollected events in much the same fashion. 
Recent assessments by Martin Campbell-Kelly, Edward Steinmuller, 
and David Mowery have likewise identified the decision to unbundle as 
a watershed moment in the history of the software industry and have 
suggested concerns about antitrust exerted a major influence over IBM 
as it took this step. 
But is the story really quite so straightforward? Does Justice de-
serve full credit for the shift in policy at IBM? Might the firm, under 
pressure from competition and trends in technology, have acted inde-
pendently? And did the decision to unbundle, whatever its roots, really 
make all that much difference to the software industry? These questions 
are worth posing, not out of a desire to reject the prevailing interpreta-
tion, but rather in an effort to sharpen our thinking about precisely how 
government intervention altered the competitive structure. 
 We can gain some insight into these questions by revisiting the 
situation prevailing in the mid-1960s, when the Justice Department re-
newed its interest in IBM and the computer industry. One story domi-
nated the industry at that time: System 360.With this new line of com-
puters, IBM had apparently reasserted its dominance over the industry. 
The value of computer hardware shipped each year by IBM, after in-
creasing steadily from just under half a billion dollars in 1959 to slight-
ly more than $2 billion [] in 1965, jumped suddenly in 1966 to $3.4 bil-
lion. The following year it exceeded $4.5 billion. IBM’s share of the 
industry total, which had slipped from around 80 percent in the early 
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sixties to less than 63 percent in 1965, surged to over 71 percent in 
1967. Those gains came at the expense of firms such as Univac, Hon-
eywell, GE, and upstart Control Data, which had once appeared to offer 
the stiffest challenge to IBM. Another potential rival, RCA, barely held 
its ground. 
At a time when computer hardware still accounted for nearly 
three-quarters of all revenue in the data processing industry, these fig-
ures could hardly have comforted those concerned about fostering 
competition in computing. In the eyes of at least some observers, more-
over, IBM’s resurgence had resulted less from the merits of its new line 
than from the heavy-handed tactics used to market the new machines. 
IBM had rushed to announce a comprehensive series of machines all at 
once in large part because of competition from Honeywell and GE. It 
had then expanded the line to counter high-end machines produced by 
Control Data and to meet the unanticipated demand for time-sharing. 
Many of these products reached customers later than promised, and 
most did not meet projected standards of performance for long after 
that. Much of the disappointing performance resulted from difficulties 
with the common operating system, which IBM had promised would 
enable machines throughout the line to run the same programs. Many 
of the private lawsuits against IBM, including that of Control Data, 
hinged upon accusations that the firm had knowingly announced its 
products prematurely. The government raised these concerns in its suit 
as well. 
When the Justice Department again focused its gaze upon IBM 
in1967, then, it was overwhelming concerned about competition among 
manufacturers of computer hardware. It homed in on the issue of bun-
dling not out of a desire to foster an independent software industry, but 
rather because it believed such bundling gave IBM an unfair advantage 
in the market for hardware by enabling it to obscure the true price and 
performance of its hardware products. IBM could shift unbilled ser-
vices and technical support across its large customer base as needed, in 
order to cover itself in quarters where it faced the stiffest competitive 
challenges. The common operating system and programming associat-
ed with System 360 facilitated these sorts of tactical responses. It was 
in this sense, rather than out of an appreciation for network effects and 
the possibility of operating systems functioning as “tails wagging 
dogs,” that Burke Marshall characterized bundling as a classic “tie.” In 
the opinion of Marshall and IBM’s crack team of lawyers, the strongest 
evidence against IBM consisted of an immense database assembled by 
Control Data documenting cases in which IBM deployed these sorts of 
marketing tactics. As part of its settlement with Control Data, IBM 
took possession of this database and promptly destroyed it, severely 
hampering the government’s case. 
12
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The primacy of hardware in the thinking of Justice Department 
officials becomes clear when we consider the position they took in the 
mid-1960s regarding the patenting of computer programs. As entrepre-
neurs in the nascent software industry pressed Congress and the patent 
office to extend patent protection to programs, the Justice Department 
initially came down hard against the idea. Following the arguments of 
many prominent law professors, including the future Supreme Court 
Justice Stephen Breyer, officials in the Justice Department argued that 
programs should exist as free goods in the public domain. They sought 
to curtail attempts to turn a grass-roots endeavor into an organized 
competition among firms holding broad proprietary rights. (IBM, with 
no interest in marketing its software independently from hardware and 
believing free software developed elsewhere encouraged computer 
sales, concurred heartily with the Justice Department on this point, as 
did other computer manufacturers. With its decision to unbundle, the 
firm hastily reversed itself, advocating strong copyright protection and 
licensing of rights.) 
In asking IBM to unbundle and charge separately for services 
such as programming, then, Justice was almost certainly not looking to 
create a proprietary software industry. Yet the question remains, did 
Justice through its antitrust action in fact create such an industry, even 
if inadvertently? 
At least one observer at the time, Walter Bauer of Informatics, 
offered some strong testimony in the affirmative. At the same 1970 
conference at which he castigated the service bureaus for not paying 
sufficient heed to the importance of applications programming, Bauer 
predicted that “unbundling or separate pricing will be the biggest factor 
in the growth of software products.” Interestingly, however, Bauer at-
tributed this significance not so much to the diminished power of IBM 
under unbundling, but rather to the sanction the firm would provide to 
the software industry. “One of the processes which will be acting to ac-
celerate the acceptance of purchased software is the fact that IBM with 
its very large sales organization will be promoting this point of view,” 
explained Bauer somewhat cynically. “There is now a fifteen-year his-
tory in modern data processing which says that the only technical or 
marketing approach which is acceptable is the way IBM does it. As a 
buyer or seller, you conform.” Bauer anticipated that IBM “will pursue 
software products aggressively,” noting that “there is probably a gen-
eral consensus and major agreement on that point.” Yet he questioned 
whether it would ultimately prevail, because IBM management was 
“basically hardware and hardware sales oriented.” Bauer predicted that 
IBM and other manufacturers would get the jump on the independents 
in the market for software products during the first half of the 1970s 
because of their established marketing presence. Independents would 
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gain the upper hand during the last half of the decade, however, be-
cause computer manufacturers “have been so long oriented to the com-
puter as hardware only, and to the provision of ‘tool’ software, that 
their ability to enter software markets and to provide systems engineer-
ing and applications engineering service has weakened over past years, 
at least relative to market demand or potential.” Putting his finger on 
what he considered the essence of the matter, Bauer concluded, “Sys-
tems work is in direct conflict with the basic objective of marketing 
hardware.” 
While Bauer clearly believed unbundling to be an important de-
velopment, the overall thrust of his comments casts some doubt upon 
the idea that the Justice Department spawned the software and software 
services enterprises. Bauer seems to suggest that these activities would 
have emerged in the ordinary course of events and that IBM would 
have responded to the new situation, though not all that effectively, re-
gardless of the constraints placed upon it by government. Is this cor-
rect? 
One can begin by asking whether IBM would have unbundled 
even without the pressure of the Justice Department. This was certainly 
the contention of the firm’s lawyers who fought the antitrust suit. They 
argued that bundling of software was an artifact of the days when IBM 
needed to foster applications programming in order to increase the size 
of the market for hardware. With the market maturing, this need had 
disappeared, and programming seemed increasingly like a costly drain 
on resources. This seemed all the more true because programming ac-
counted for a steadily larger share of IBM’s development resources. In 
the late fifties, according to Phister’s data, the money spent on pro-
gramming development was a mere 4 percent of that devoted to engi-
neering. By the mid-sixties, this figure had jumped to more than 60 
percent. Over that stretch of time, the number of programmers had 
jumped from less than 100 to over 2500. Tom Watson later recalled his 
chagrin in discovering that programming for System 360, particularly 
its critical operating system, appeared not to yield the economies of 
scale customarily achieved in manufacturing. The man in charge of de-
veloping that system later wrote a famous book, The Mythical Man-
Month, which attempted to explain the reasons. Given these character-
istics of software and the increasing proportion of consumer dollars 
flowing toward it, the lawyers contended, IBM and other manufacturers 
would simply have to charge for programming if it hoped to recoup its 
investments. 
The incentives to charge for programming grew all the more in-
tense because of two trends in technology pursued by competitors. The 
first was the creation of emulators, or programs that enabled a machine 
of one hardware design to run applications programs written for anoth-
14
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er. In 1963, Honeywell announced an emulator that enabled its new 
computers to mimic the workhorse IBM 1401, and soon RCA followed 
with an emulator of its own. By breaking the close ties between pro-
gramming and particular hardware, emulators accomplished much of 
what unbundling might accomplish, as Honeywell’s choice of the name 
“Liberator” for its emulator suggests. In the eyes of IBM, emulators al-
lowed firms to get a free ride on its investment in programming. Initial-
ly, IBM had planned to introduce System 360 without an emulator. In 
effect, it hoped to tie users to a new architecture and operating system, 
and conceivably compel them to develop new applications programs. In 
the end, however, IBM could not resist the advancing tide and offered 
software that enabled most System 360 models to operate as if they 
were a 1401. User surveys suggest that more than half of the time 
logged by the new machines during the first [two] years was spent in 
emulator mode. 
At about the same time some competitors began offering emula-
tors capable of running a broad array of applications, others introduced 
machines with a minimum of software tailored for particular niche op-
erations. Firms aiming at the scientific user, such as SDS and DEC, led 
the way. But over time, other firms showed how these lean machines, 
unburdened by extensive software, could undercut IBM’s more general 
purpose machines in particular markets. 
 Taken together, these developments certainly called into ques-
tion the strategic wisdom of tightly coupling software and hardware. 
But whether IBM would have responded in the way its lawyers im-
plied, without added pressure from the Justice Department, neverthe-
less remains open to question. As Bauer understood, IBM remained 
tied to the idea that software existed to sell hardware. Much of the im-
petus behind System 360 had been to perpetuate that mode of opera-
tions by at once establishing a new basic configuration and spreading 
the costs of programming across an ever larger group of machines, thus 
allowing IBM to leverage its volumes more effectively. Ironically, Sys-
tem 360 had also served to create a large base of installed machines ca-
pable of running common programs. That base opened unprecedented 
opportunities for independent software providers to write standard pro-
grams (much as the PC would later do on a much more spectacular 
scale). IBM appears not to have anticipated that development (just as it 
and other firms would later fail to grasp the profound implications of 
the PC for software). When IBM did unbundle its software, moreover, 
it dropped the price of its hardware a mere 3 percent. This figure, 
though justifiable on certain grounds, certainly fell on the low end of 
the range anticipated by observers at the time. IBM also made no 
moves to unbundle the operating system and other control programs. 
These remained bundled until Amdahl and other manufacturers, capi-
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talizing on the antitrust provisions pertaining to licensing, had placed 
significant numbers of cloned IBM CPU’s on the market and IBM per-
ceived an opportunity to reclaim some of its losses in hardware by sell-
ing operating software to these Original Equipment Manufacturers—
OEMs and their customers. (Pressure from the EU during the early 
1970s may also have contributed to the decision to market parts of the 
operating system separately.) 
If it seems unlikely that IBM would have moved aggressively 
toward unbundling without pressure from the Justice Department, the 
question still remains whether IBM could have stemmed the trends in 
technology and retarded the rise of the software industry had it not un-
bundled. For those frustrated software entrepreneurs of the mid-1960s 
who complained they could not hope to make a go of it in the industry 
so long as IBM gave away its software, this question may appear pre-
posterous. Yet there are some grounds, both theoretical and in the his-
torical evidence, to doubt whether bundling really erected such an im-
penetrable barrier to entry. 
The theoretical grounds involve the matter of whether bundling 
in this case largely served to facilitate some sort of cross-subsidy be-
tween hardware and software that could not long persist under the ordi-
nary course of competition. Software entrepreneurs frequently asserted 
that IBM used the bloated prices of its hardware to subsidize software. 
Yet in the eyes of the Justice Department and many others, the subsidy 
seemed if anything to flow the other way with IBM’s low programming 
costs per machine giving it a critical advantage in the competition with 
hardware providers. The pioneering strategies of firms such as DEC, 
which hardly came into view at the time Justice launched its inquiry but 
figured prominently in the decision to drop the case, showed how com-
petitors might root out these cross-subsidies and exploit them. Similar-
ly, pioneering software firms such as ADR and Informatics had by the 
mid-1960s demonstrated how programs targeted toward input/output 
control and file management could outperform those developed by 
IBM, in large part because these pioneers found ways to achieve the 
same level of performance with less hardware. As Bauer of Informatics 
understood, firms oriented toward sales of hardware felt little incentive 
to write such software. Their bundles likely harbored significant ineffi-
ciencies. 
How prevalent were firms such as ADR and Informatics, which 
managed to exploit these opportunities and crack the market for soft-
ware even before IBM’s move to unbundle? If we restrict our definition 
strictly to firms selling or licensing proprietary software, the answer is 
clearly “not very.” Phister’s data give no accounting of software sales 
prior to 1963 and record no significant purchases of software by users 
for another [four] years after that. They do suggest, though, that be-
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tween 1963 and 1967 the purchased software sector grew from $5 mil-
lion in annual revenue to $175 million, or about 3 percent of total reve-
nue in the data processing industry (which, coincidentally or otherwise, 
was the amount IBM chose to drop its hardware prices with unbun-
dling). Because software at this point was so closely tied to data ser-
vices, we might get a more accurate read on the situation by consider-
ing the services sector as well. Interestingly, the share of industry 
revenues derived from services between 1963 and 1967 declined by 
almost precisely 3 percent, from nearly 13 percent to just under 10 per-
cent. The rise of standard packaged software during these years appears 
possibly to have come at the expense of services (though the absolute 
amount of revenue from services during these years nearly doubled, 
from $265 million to $560 million). 
Did these trends change noticeably after 1968, the year IBM un-
bundled? Yes, they did, but not in the way one might expect. The share 
of revenue from software continued to increase at about the same rate 
for another [two] years, then stabilized from 1969 through 1973 at ap-
proximately 4.5 percent (or $600 million in 1973). The real action oc-
curred in services. After its low of just under 10 percent in 1967, the 
services sector increased its share to 17.5 percent by 1970. It stayed at 
that level or slightly above for another half decade, when it rose to just 
over 20 percent. The share derived from hardware virtually mirrored 
the trend in services, falling sharply from nearly 74 percent in 1967 to 
62 percent in 1970, where it remained until further decline in 1975. It 
was services, then, not software, that grew rapidly in the immediate 
wake of unbundling. Software did increase its share in the late 1970s, 
rising to 7.7 percent in 1978. By then, services accounted for 20.5 per-
cent and hardware 58.4 percent. 
The rapid rise of services relative to software takes on added sig-
nificance, moreover, when we consider that the industry figures include 
IBM. According to Phister, services actually declined in significance at 
IBM during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1966, IBM earned 3.5 
percent of its data processing revenue from services, plus another 5.2 
percent from the service bureau. By 1972, services accounted for just 
0.7 percent of IBM revenue from data processing, with the service bu-
reau contributing another 1.3 percent in its last year of ownership by 
IBM. Unfortunately, we have no data on the amount of revenue IBM 
derived from software during these years. Phister estimates that from 
1974 through 1978, however, IBM generated between 10.2 and 12.4 
percent of its revenue from services, supplies, and software. (This 
number corresponds fairly closely to the estimate of Charles Lecht that 
IBM accounted for roughly 8-10 percent of the total data processing in-
dustry pie from these activities in 1976.) Given the paltry level of ser-
vices [two] years before and the identified share of 1.4 percent for sup-
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plies, this would suggest IBM derived something on the order of 7.5 
percent or more of its data processing revenue from software during 
these years. If correct, these estimates suggest that IBM accounted for 
perhaps three-quarters of total industry revenues generated from pur-
chased software products during the decade after unbundling. 
What, then, are we to conclude about the significance of unbun-
dling for the software industry during the first [ten] years of the new 
practices? The most important effect appears to have been to establish a 
clearer separation between hardware manufacture and computer ser-
vices, much as the Justice Department had attempted with its consent 
decree of 1956. Competitive forces and trends in technology may have 
pushed the industry in this direction even in the absence of antitrust ac-
tion. Some prime movers in services, such as Perot’s EDS, had 
emerged during the years immediately prior to the antitrust investiga-
tion that began in 1967. One source estimates that by 1965 some forty 
significant service providers had emerged, and that the industry includ-
ed as many as 2800 firms all told. In pursuing its case, the Justice De-
partment clearly focused more on the concerns of hardware manufac-
turers such as Control Data than on those of the software and services 
sector. 
To the extent that services constitute a branch of software, we can 
say that antitrust may well have hastened the emergence of the software 
industry during the late 1960s and early 1970s, if perhaps a bit inad-
vertently. The action by government certainly did nothing to impede 
the forces propelling the emergence of a separate and vibrant services 
sector, and Justice may well have hastened the process by causing IBM 
to withdraw from services. That withdrawal, however, was balanced to 
some degree by increased marketing by IBM of standard programs. 
This packaged program sector lagged behind services and the projected 
estimates of observers such as Bauer, who had anticipated independent 
software providers would soon overtake IBM in this rapidly expanding 
field during the late 1970s. That development would eventually come 
to pass, but only after the emergence of the personal computer during 
the early 1980s.21 
POST 1982 – THE ANTITRUST LEGACY AND THE PC REVOLUTION 
Usselman (2004) describes the latest chapter that has IBM as a target of antitrust 
scrutiny—one that ends in giving birth to the PC revolution and, ironically, with IBM as 
a witness for the government in its antitrust suit against Microsoft: 
 
During the course of the long antitrust proceedings against IBM, 
                                                	   21.	  	   Id.	  at	  104-­‐11	  (internal	  citations	  omitted).	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which stretched from January 1969 well into 1982, the American com-
puter industry experienced sustained rapid change. Continual refine-
ment of solid-state production technology made available processors of 
much higher speed and also dramatically increased the memory and 
storage capacities of computing systems. Increased capacities gave 
programmers much greater latitude. Instead of devoting the lion’s share 
of their energies to conserving processor time, programmers increasing-
ly could focus their efforts on making computers receive data in differ-
ent forms, manipulate it in various ways, and present the results in 
more comprehensible fashion. Data processing continued its metamor-
phosis into information processing. The modular design of System 360, 
in combination with new systems applications such as time-sharing, 
opened huge opportunities for equipment manufacturers to concentrate 
on building lower-cost versions of common components such as print-
ers and terminals that could be used within IBM systems. The 1956 
consent decree had at last begun to bear fruit. Additional competition 
came from dynamic new firms such as Digital Equipment Company 
and Wang Industries. Taking advantage of the plummeting cost and 
shrinking size of components, these start-up companies built “mini-
computers” tailored to serve particular types of users. 
Meanwhile, miniaturization unleashed an alternative path of in-
novation that fell entirely outside the IBM paradigm and the realm of 
institutional users it served. Individual enthusiasts began to patch to-
gether one-of-a-kind computers of limited capacity. Infused with a 
strong anti-institutional ideology and renegade spirit, these hackers 
brought the vision of a “home computer” into reality. The era of the un-
shackled amateurs did not last for long, however, as firms such as Ap-
ple Computer and IBM soon imposed a degree of order on the PC mar-
ket. Rather than offer a stripped-down, expandable kit that customers 
could assemble and refine themselves, Apple sold a standard machine 
that included its own monitor, disc drive, and keyboard. The company 
also provided several basic software packages. As Apple’s revenues 
soared from three-quarters of a million dollars in 1977 to just under a 
billion dollars in 1983, IBM launched a crash program to develop a mi-
crocomputer of its own. Its PC, introduced in 1981, immediately cap-
tured 26 percent of the market. The impact of the PC went well beyond 
IBM’s own sales, moreover, because the product’s modular design and 
extensive use of licensed components left other manufacturers free to 
produce clones that accounted for another 50 percent or more of the 
market. In effect, IBM with the PC repeated its experience with System 
360 in mainframe computing, only in fast forward. Drawing on its 
market presence and its capacity for technical compromise, IBM pro-
vided a platform that helped rapidly transform the desktop computer in-
to a standardized mass-produced commodity, then watched as low-cost 
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competitors undercut it in the marketplace.  
By all accounts, the rapid diffusion of the PC has been the most 
important factor in the growth of the packaged software industry. 
Though virtually no one anticipated it at the time, the PC revolution-
ized the industry by providing a mass market of unprecedented propor-
tions for standard software products. Because software is expensive to 
generate but cheap to reproduce, this mass market fundamentally 
changed the dynamics of an industry that had always been hampered by 
severe constraints on productivity. Now, software producers could 
amortize their development costs across a vast number of machines. 
Network externalities, particularly the increasing social returns from 
standardization of basic programs, reinforced the phenomenon. 
What role did antitrust play in this stunning development? Cer-
tainly, we can find little direct evidence that government anticipated 
these trends from the start and sought actively to give shape to the in-
dustry. It may be, however, that the legacy of the antitrust actions of 
1956 and the late 1960s did in fact exert some influence over the course 
of events. Such an argument hinges largely upon the critical decisions 
by IBM to license both the operating system on a nonexclusive basis 
from Microsoft and the chip containing the central processing unit on a 
similar basis from Intel. Did these decisions, made during the final 
stages of the long antitrust suit against it, reflect a concern deep within 
IBM about tying up the industry with closed, proprietary systems? Af-
ter years of antitrust surveillance, had IBM adjusted its thinking and 
strategies to the point that it instinctively unbundled? 
Perhaps, but more likely, the firm simply failed to anticipate the 
future. As one executive close to the situation recalled, the thinking of 
top management was that the PC was a small market, and one cannot 
make big mistakes in small markets. Watts Humphrey recalls that some 
within IBM did in fact question the decision to license the operating 
system, but that in its frustration at not having moved more quickly into 
the market for small machines, top management suspended its custom-
ary vigilance regarding such exposures. Soon enough, moreover, IBM 
certainly went to considerable efforts to recover from these blunders 
and to reestablish proprietary control with its own operating system and 
input/output channels. Of course, by then it had triumphed in the anti-
trust case and no longer dominated the industry. 
If government appears not to have directly stimulated the trans-
formation associated with the PC, it certainly wasted little time in ad-
dressing the state of competition in the industry that resulted. For that 
transformation had by no means eliminated the need for the essential 
balancing acts that had long characterized the computer industry and its 
leading firms. Computers remained machines of indeterminate purpose. 
Indeed, as they grew more commonplace and came into the hands of a 
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more diverse population, the possibilities of what they might do con-
tinued to expand. Within the separate but parallel realms Apple and 
IBM had created, designers and programmers thus still needed to strike 
compromises and achieve a balance between standardization and cus-
tomization. 
By the mid-1980s, that ongoing balancing act had come to focus 
on two fundamental issues—the design and production of the micro-
processor, and the basic operating language. With Apple, both were 
proprietary; in the case of the PC, they were shaped respectively by In-
tel and Microsoft, the firms IBM had chosen as its original suppliers. In 
a move that clearly heralded its prominence in hardware production, In-
tel in the early 1990s began advertising directly to consumers. It gave 
its processors catchy names and insisted that machines containing its 
processors carry an “Intel Inside” sticker. Meanwhile, Microsoft had 
grown more profitable than IBM. As owner of the MS-DOS and Win-
dows operating programs, it supplied the essential gateways through 
which most users gained access to their PCs. 
Like IBM in the early mainframe computer industry, these pow-
erful firms established a degree of uniformity in the essentials of com-
puting without closing off the potential for further development. They 
continued to introduce new generations of processors and operating 
systems that placed greater computing power at the hands of individual 
consumers. Their influence and market power gave suppliers of 
memory, printers, and monitors confidence to pursue techniques of 
mass production. Most importantly, software writers could proceed 
with some assurance that their work would find a broad market and not 
be rendered obsolete by subsequent changes in basic hardware or in the 
basic operating system. As a result, the microcomputer industry sus-
tained a vibrant competition to develop new applications, and comput-
ers came to perform a much broader array of functions. 
And as with IBM before them, these dominant firms attracted 
virulent criticism. Competitors and some consumers accused them of 
wielding their market influence unfairly to close off technical alterna-
tives. Vibrant competition first from the Japanese and then from do-
mestic chip manufacturers kept Intel insulated from antitrust prosecu-
tion. But critics of Microsoft achieved considerable inroads. 
Throughout much of the 1990s, they persuaded the Department of Jus-
tice and attorneys general of several states to pursue vigorous antitrust 
action against the software giant. In their most extreme form, these ac-
tions would have forced Microsoft to sever all connections with hard-
ware suppliers and banned it from the applications business, in effect 
leaving the firm to operate as a common carrier for specialized software 
programs written by others. 
A settlement announced in the summer of 1994 stopped short of 
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either action. As it had in the case of IBM, the Justice Department de-
termined that Microsoft managed to provide a healthy stability without 
stifling development. When a federal judge overturned the settlement in 
early 1995, the Justice Department and Microsoft briefly joined in an 
unlikely alliance that successfully appealed the decision. The erstwhile 
combatants renewed their hostilities shortly thereafter, however, as Jus-
tice Department officials accused Microsoft of violating the 1994 
agreement by bundling its operating system with its internet browser 
and prohibiting suppliers of PCs from displaying icons for rival brows-
ers on the Windows screen. When the first federal judge to hear the 
case concurred, it appeared Microsoft might be broken apart and the 
boundaries of the software industry redrawn in the radical fashion its 
most ardent critics desired. Rulings in the subsequent appeals, together 
with a change in administration at the Justice Department, produced an 
outcome considerably less hostile to Microsoft. 
These actions against Microsoft bore a striking resemblance to 
those taken against IBM during the previous half century of American 
computing. Following long traditions in antitrust, Justice sought to sep-
arate the operating system, which now plays the role once held by 
hardware and logical design, from the applications software, which oc-
cupies the position once held by services (and, to a much lesser degree, 
software). Justice appeared to be on its strongest grounds when show-
ing clear evidence that Microsoft used the tie between the operating 
system and other parts of the PC complex to exploit concessions from 
hardware manufacturers (evidence provided most unequivocally by 
IBM, now the proselytizer of non-proprietary open systems) and to 
suppress the emergence of independent providers of applications soft-
ware. Its proposed remedy, though a bit more drastic than those of the 
1950s and 1960s, shared with those earlier actions a desire to break the 
ties and establish clearer separations. Market segmentation, it was 
hoped, would foster competition and innovation. Microsoft and its de-
fenders (including many economists) responded that such alleged ties 
cannot make economic sense over the long haul and that trends in tech-
nology would undermine any apparent advantages the firm derived 
from its dominance in operating systems. As before, it was difficult to 
see how the actions by Justice would in any way retard the forces of 
economic competition or impede those trends in technology. Though 
the settlement left the dominant firm largely unaltered and free for the 
moment to compete without significant restriction in the marketplace, it 
also left little doubt that government would continue monitoring the 
boundaries of computing, as it had throughout the history of the indus-
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try.22 
CONCLUSION 
By any measure, the American computing industry has been a remarkable econom-
ic success, and by any measure, IBM has been at the forefront of the industry’s extraor-
dinary achievements.23 Therefore, IBM’s history and actions have an oversize role in un-
derstanding the history and development of the computer industry, and in turn, the 
computer industry has a weighted role in shaping America’s economic growth for the 
past century. Although this historical analysis, designed to understand the efficacy of a 
particular antitrust policy, offers only a limited window into the panoply of applications 
of that policy, it focuses on an exceedingly important slice. This is far from a generaliza-
ble analysis, but it is also far from an insignificant one. 
Accordingly, as we explore the consequences of the Justice Departments scrutiny 
of IBM’s bundling strategies, we obtain a meaningful insight into the efficacy of an anti-
trust policy that polices illegal ties. The contribution that anti-bundling antitrust policies 
have had on the overall economy—not just on IBM’s trajectory—is significant enough 
for one of the instant authors to credit American competition policy for being one of the 
ingredients to the remarkable success of the nation’s computer industry. 
Throughout the history of this remarkable industry, government has through these 
tools (and, to a degree, through its funding and purchasing as well) sought persistently to 
shape demand in ways that countered the strong tendencies of network externalities to 
reinforce first-mover advantages. In particular, government has attempted whenever pos-
sible to break the bonds between provides of basic platforms and firms oriented toward 
tailoring those platforms to meet the varied desires of consumers. Though often obscured 
by the intense focus on government’s role in funding the industry, these policies pertain-
ing to competition have managed to encourage consumer-oriented innovation without 
sacrificing the social benefits derived from the stability of basic platforms. Working in 
concert with trends in technology and the forces of competition, they have given shape to 
the industry and helped foster those qualities that impart such a distinctive vitality to 
American computing.24 
We have no illusion that our account here will be the final word on the wisdom and 
efficiency of policing ties and prosecuting monopolists for bundling products. Signifi-
cant work remains in Professor Elhauge’s campaign against the single monopoly theory. 
Nonetheless, an eye to empirics, and specifically history, should be a refreshing addition 
to the debate, and we hope this account adds some artillery to Professor Elhauge’s 
broader crusade. 
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